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Article
WHEN A COLLEGE COACH’S AGENT RECRUITS THE
COACH’S PLAYERS: POTENTIAL LEGAL AND
NCAA RAMIFICATIONS
JOSHUA LENS
In a recent and seemingly natural trend, many agents who represent
college football coaches recruit and attempt to sign the coach’s student-ath-
letes.  While much has been written on the myriad conflicts of interest in the
sports agent industry, this Article is the first to focus on the recruitment and
signing of players coached by agents’ current clients.  The Article argues that
the practice constitutes a conflict of interest when the player is a draft-eligible
underclassman with remaining eligibility.  This Article argues that practice
should not be permitted.
College coaches and their agents also must recognize the fact that a
coach’s involvement in an agent’s player recruiting can result in NCAA
violations.  The recent FBI investigation into corruption in men’s college
basketball, while unfortunate, provides a prime example.  This Article ex-
plores possible NCAA rules implications that can result from a college
coach’s involvement in his or her agent’s player recruiting.  Finally, the Arti-
cle suggests parameters that college coaches should put in place to mitigate
the likelihood of NCAA rules violations when their agents seek to recruit their
student-athletes.
* Joshua is a Clinical Assistant Professor in the Recreation and Sport Manage-
ment program at the University of Arkansas (J.D., University of Iowa College of
Law; B.A., University of Northern Iowa).  Prior to entering academia, Joshua spent
seven years on Baylor University’s athletics compliance staff, during which time he
had the privilege of overseeing the university’s agent administration program.  Sev-
eral student-athletes and their families honored Joshua by including him in their
agent selection process.  Any views expressed in this Article are the author’s and
are not necessarily representative of the University of Arkansas or Baylor Univer-
sity.  Any mistakes are, of course, the author’s.
(1)
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2016, University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) junior
offensive tackle Laremy Tunsil announced he would leave Ole Miss
early and make himself available for the 2016 NFL draft.1  A few
months later, and just minutes before the draft, someone hacked
1. See Ole Miss Athletics, Laremy Tunsil Declares for NFL Draft, OLE MISS SPORTS
(Jan. 4, 2016), www.olemisssports.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/010416aah.html
[https://perma.cc/5UV4-8MQX] (thanking Tunsil for, and listing his contribu-
tions to, Ole Miss).
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Tunsil’s Twitter account and posted a video of Tunsil wearing a gas
mask and smoking marijuana through a bong.2  At one point con-
sidered the likely number one overall pick, Tunsil slid in the draft
until the Miami Dolphins drafted him with the thirteenth overall
pick.3  While the bong and gas mask video deterred other teams
from drafting Tunsil, the Dolphins felt comfortable selecting him
in part because the Dolphins head coach at the time, Adam Gase,
was able to talk about Tunsil with the agent they share, Jimmy Sex-
ton, in a way Gase could completely trust.4
Things took another unexpected turn when in a news confer-
ence shortly after the Dolphins selected Tunsil, he admitted he ac-
cepted money from Ole Miss coaches in violation of NCAA rules.5
Before Tunsil could answer a question about whether he had spo-
ken with NCAA investigators, a woman who worked for Sexton in-
terrupted and ushered Tunsil off stage.6
At the time the Tunsil draft night hack and news conference
occurred, the NCAA had just completed a three-year investigation
of the Ole Miss football, women’s basketball, and track and field
programs.7  A few days later, with speculation swirling about Tunsil,
the NCAA reopened its investigation of the Ole Miss football pro-
2. See Will Hobson, Ole Miss Football Pinned its NCAA Scandal to a Rogue Assis-
tant.  He’s Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/sports/colleges/hugh-freeze-is-out-but-ole-miss-still-pins-ncaa-issues-on-
this-career-assistant/2017/08/10/11fac660-7c99-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.
html?noredicted=on&utm_term=a19d19088f22 [https://perma.cc/NBW2-UNMF]
(describing plight of former Ole Miss football staff member Barney Farrar as it
relates to NCAA investigation into potential violations in Ole Miss football
program).
3. See Kevin Seifert, Laremy Tunsil Slides to Dolphins at No. 13 After Gas Mask
Tweet, ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2016, 9:54 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/
laremy-tunsil-slides-dolphins-13-gas-mask-tweet/story?id=38750252 [https://
perma.cc/V54A-P5JD] (noting that Tunsil admits that video depicts him but was
leaked by someone who hacked his social media).
4. See Mike Florio, Sexton Connection Surely Helped Adam Gase Feel Better About
Laremy Tunsil, NBC SPORTS PRO FOOTBALL TALK (May 3, 2016, 12:25 PM), https://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2016/05/03/sexton-connection-surely-helped-ad
am-gase-feel-better-about-laremy-tunsil/ [https://perma.cc/U29A-EK8X] (noting
that agent who represents both coach and his player can be conflict of interest but
this exact scenario helped Dolphins and their head coach feel more at ease in
drafting Tunsil).
5. See Hobson, supra note 2 (describing former Ole Miss football staff member R
Barney Farrar’s account of, and involvement in, Tunsil saga and suggesting any
payments coaches made to Tunsil may have been permissible under NCAA rules by
claiming they originated from “student-athlete opportunity fund” which permits
certain expenditures for student-athletes based on need).
6. See id.
7. See id. (noting that NCAA re-opened investigation into Ole Miss football
program).
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gram.8  The investigation culminated with the NCAA charging Ole
Miss with twenty-one violations of NCAA rules, leaving then-head
coach Hugh Freeze facing potential penalties that could impact his
ability to coach in the future and, as a result, impacting his career.9
Sexton also serves as Freeze’s agent.10
Freeze eventually resigned when he became caught up in a def-
amation lawsuit filed by his predecessor, Houston Nutt, against Ole
Miss.11  Nutt’s lawsuit alleged that Ole Miss broke its severance
agreement with Nutt when Ole Miss and Freeze allegedly told me-
dia members and recruits that it was Nutt’s staff members who com-
mitted the NCAA violations.12  Nutt’s agent at the time Ole Miss
hired him was, of course, Sexton.13  During the course of the law-
suit, Nutt produced evidence of a phone call from Freeze to a num-
ber connected to an escort service, leading Freeze to resign.14
Ole Miss assistant coach Matt Luke replaced Freeze as the head
coach on an interim basis, and subsequently on a permanent ba-
sis.15  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Sexton is also Luke’s agent.16
Freeze had trouble finding new employment until recently.
Fellow Sexton client and University of Alabama head football coach
Nick Saban was among at least five Southeastern Conference
(“SEC”) head coaches who contacted Freeze about a position in the
2018 offseason.17  However, the SEC and its commissioner, Greg
8. See id. (noting that speculation swirled regarding text messages from Tun-
sil’s hacked phone that incriminated Ole Miss football staff members).
9. See id. (explaining that alleged violations ranged in seriousness from egre-
gious to minor).
10. See id. (noting that show-cause order was among possible penalties for
Freeze).
11. See id.
12. See Gray Hardison, Houston Nutt Wants You to Believe Hugh Freeze Cost Him a
Coaching Job, SB NATION (July 14, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.redcuprebellion.
com/2017/7/14/15967402/houston-nutt-ole-miss-lawsuit-hugh-freeze-someone-
give-hootie-a-dollar [https://perma.cc/L82N-HMEG] (analyzing Nutt’s legal
claims against Ole Miss).
13. See id. (referring to Sexton as “contract wizard”).
14. See Hobson, supra note 2 (noting that Freeze admitted to “pattern of mis- R
conduct” at Ole Miss, including phone call to escort service).
15. See Zach Barnett, Jimmy Sexton Represents 11 of the 14 SEC Head Coaches,
FOOTBALL SCOOP (Dec. 7, 2017), footballscoop.com/news/jimmy-sexton-repre-
sents-11-14-sec-head-coaches/ [https://perma.cc/SC86-HLSW] (listing Southeast-
ern Conference head football coaches represented by Sexton).
16. See id.
17. See John Talty and Matt Zenitz, What Really Happened Between Hugh Freeze,
Alabama, and the SEC, AL.COM (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.al.com/alabamafoot
ball/index.ssf/2018/04/what_really_happened_between_h.html?platform=hoot
suite [https://perma.cc/JCG4-FR7R] (detailing Saban’s flirtation with notion of
hiring Freeze and reaction of SEC office).
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Sankey, encouraged Alabama to refrain from hiring Freeze due to
the personal shortcomings that led to his departure from Ole
Miss.18  After a year and a half of unemployment, Liberty University
hired Freeze in December 2018.19
In today’s high-stakes, big-money college football industry,
many coaches have agents who provide them with valuable services.
Section II of this Article discusses the many roles that sports agents
undertake for their clients.  Given their importance and wide-rang-
ing duties, conflicts of interest are prevalent in the sports agency
trade.  As illustrated by the above example, the college football in-
dustry can weave an exceedingly entangled web.  Next, Section III
examines authorities, considerations, and examples of conflicts of
interest in the sports agency field.
For business reasons, many agents who represent college
coaches recruit student-athletes who play for the coaches they re-
present.  Section IV examines whether coaches and their agents
should be more concerned with conflicts of interest and their
ramifications or whether is it acceptable for agents like Sexton to
represent the myriad individuals described in the situation above.
Section V discusses potential NCAA rules implications for coaches
in this scenario.  Section V concludes by suggesting parameters for
college coaches to adopt and implement in order to mitigate the
likelihood of NCAA rules violations when their agents recruit play-
ers from their programs.
II. STATUS AND ROLES OF SPORTS AGENTS
Legendary professional football coach Vince Lombardi fa-
mously refused to deal with agents.20  According to legend, when
informed that an agent came to negotiate a player’s contract with
Lombardi in the early 1960s, he walked into his office and closed
the door.21  Lombardi returned a few minutes later to inform the
18. See id.
19. See Tom Schad and Dan Wolken, Liberty Hires Former Mississippi Coach Hugh
Freeze, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaaf/2018/12/07/hugh-freeze-liberty-football-coach/2236886002/
[https://perma.cc/4JRG-C85W] (describing Liberty University’s hiring of Freeze).
20. See Simon Johnson, Show Me the Money!!!  Player Agents and Conflicts of Inter-
est, 1 ANZ SPORTS LAW J. 103, 125 (2006) (listing and describing numerous con-
flicts of interest in sports agency industry).
21. See id. (noting that Lombardi story is just one example of his crude but
effective method of frustrating agents).
5
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agent that he was negotiating with the wrong team—Lombardi had
just traded the agent’s client to another team.22
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines agency as “the
fiduciary relationship that results from a manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other to act.”23  Over the
past several decades, athletes have become increasingly reliant on
their agents.24  Sports agents have a tremendous amount of power
today.25  They play a critical role in their clients’ lives by managing
business affairs off the field, enabling athletes to focus on their per-
formance on the field.26  An agent’s main function is to negotiate
the athlete’s employment contract with his team.27  Generally, the
agent’s goal is to maximize the athlete’s salary for as long a period
of time as possible.28  To do so, the agent must understand a multi-
tude of issues, including the league’s collective bargaining agree-
ment and salary cap, market value of the client, market value of
similar athletes, and needs of the team.29  Agents may also help cli-
ents obtain endorsement contracts and assist with investment, fi-
nancial, estate planning and income tax counseling.30  Some say
that the modern agent even assumes additional roles, including psy-
chologist, social planner, and babysitter.31
22. See id. (identifying player in question as Jim Ringo, who Lombardi dealt to
Philadelphia).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
24. See Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete
Representation, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 194, 197 (2004) (noting myriad roles agents
play for clients including psychologist, babysitter, social planner, counselor, fi-
nance manager, accountant, tax and estate planner, and attorney).
25. See Patrick Connors et al., Panel III: Ethics and Sports: Agent Regulation, 14
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 747, 749 (2004) (emphasizing role of
agents in negotiating contracts between players and teams as well as players need-
ing someone besides family members in whom to trust).
26. See James Masteralexis, Lisa Masteralexis, & Kevin Snyder, Enough is
Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sport Agents, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS
L. J. 69, 69 (2013) (describing “critical role” agents play in lives of clients).
27. See Melissa Neiman, Fair Game: Ethical Considerations in Negotiation by Sports
Agents, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 123, 125 (2007) (highlighting ethical consid-
erations for agents who are attorneys).
28. See id. at 123.
29. See id. (explaining that agent should provide client with information nec-
essary for client to make informed decision).
30. See id. (noting that only top players generally obtain endorsement deals).
31. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 194 (describing roles of modern sports agent
in addition to negotiating contracts).
6
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol26/iss1/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 7 21-FEB-19 10:04
2019] WHEN A COLLEGE COACH’S AGENT RECRUITS PLAYERS 7
Agents who represent college coaches work with athletics di-
rectors to facilitate the hiring of coaches and staff.32  Agents must
delicately balance the responsibilities they owe to clients with main-
taining positive relationships with athletics department administra-
tors.33  Not only do head coaches have agents, but assistant coaches
do, too.34
Given an agent’s wide range of responsibilities and the possibil-
ity of a large and diverse client list, it is important for agents and
their actual and potential clients to understand conflicts of interest.
The following section examines sports agents’ conflict of interest
authorities, considerations, and examples.
III. SPORTS AGENTS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AUTHORITIES,
CONSIDERATIONS, AND EXAMPLES
In order to understand the potential existence of a conflict of
interest resulting from a coach’s agent recruiting an underclassman
from the coach’s program, it is imperative to fully understand con-
flicts of interest generally.  While the regulation of professionals
(e.g., attorneys) is typically well-defined and accepted, the sports
agency profession is not as old, and thus its code of conduct is not
as well-defined.35  Fortunately, academics have written extensively
on conflicts of interest for sports agents.  This section provides an
overview of conflicts of interest authorities and considerations as
well as examples of actual or potential conflicts of interest for sports
agents.  This analysis sets up Section IV, which returns to the
unique potential conflict of interest scenario involving
underclassmen.
32. See Richard Johnson, How a *Normal* College Football Coaching Hire Goes
Down, Explained by an Agent, SB NATION (Nov. 16, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://
www.sbnation.com/college-football/2017/11/16/16648940/how-college-football-
coach-hires-work [https://perma.cc/426T-GN9F] (providing behind-the-scenes
perspective on typical process by which universities hire head football coaches).
33. See id. (noting coach-agents may need to work with same athletic depart-
ment administrators in future).
34. See Jeremy Fowler, Inside Conflicted World of Agents Repping College Coaches,
NFL Players, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-foot
ball/news/inside-conflicted-world-of-agents-repping-college-coaches-nfl-players/
[https://perma.cc/4UHK-M2R2?type=image] (describing scenario in which
coach’s players sign with his agent).
35. See Paul T. Dee, Ethical Aspects of Representing Professional Athletes, 3 MARQ.
SPORTS L. J. 111, 111 (1992) (utilizing comparison to physicians, attorneys, and
engineers, who author believes have more well-defined and accepted professions).
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Given the key roles an agent serves in an athlete’s life, an ath-
lete places great trust in his agent.36  Trust is integral to the athlete-
agent relationship.37  The athlete is often young with little experi-
ence in the fields of business and negotiation and thus susceptible
to exploitation by agents.38  An athlete has one career, but an agent
typically has many clients.39  Thus, while difficult, it is imperative
that an agent’s clients—whether coaches or athletes—understand
the potential for conflicts of interest and how they can affect repre-
sentation.40  A conflict of interest can result in an agent’s inability
to devote enough time to a client or keep individual clients’ inter-
ests separate, leading to compromised service.41
Unfortunately, conflicts of interest are a predominant ethical
dilemma in sports representation.42  In fact, they run rampant be-
cause numerous situations unique to sports representation can in-
volve conflicts of interest.43  The underlying source of sports agents’
conflicts of interest is the fierce competition for clients.44  The re-
36. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 69 (noting that violation of this trust can
have substantial consequences including loss of eligibility, harm to college football
program, and financial loss for athlete).
37. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 220 (describing athletes’ dependence on
agents).
38. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 80 (explaining that player is at risk of
exploitation by agent who makes decisions without player’s input).
39. See Dave Anderson, Sports of the Times; Agents’ Schemes and Harmful Effects,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/19/sports/sports-
of-the-times-agents-schemes-and-harmful-effects.html [https://perma.cc/V4K4-
UVKX] (describing agents who put their bottom lines ahead of their clients’
careers).
40. See Bryan Blair, Conflicts of Interest: What Coaches Should Know About Their
Representation, HOOPDIRT.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), https://hoopdirt.com/conflicts-of-
interest-what-coaches-should-know-about-their-representation/ [https://perma.
cc/L9EM-Y9TC] (noting that conflict of interest can affect representation); see also
Evan Brennan, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Rookie NFL Players, SPORTS
AGENT BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), https://sportsagentblog.com/2013/11/20/conflicts-
of-interest-in-the-representation-of-rookie-nfl-players/ [https://perma.cc/8HL3-
9MP4] (noting that identification of conflict of interest is often not obvious for
players, especially rookies).
41. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 210, 234 (noting that additional unique issues
can arise at larger, consolidated agencies).
42. See Jamie E. Brown, The Battle the Fans Never See: Conflicts of Interest for Sports
Lawyers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813, 816 (1994) (explaining there are situations
unique to sports agency industry that cause conflicts of interest).
43. See Blair, supra note 40; see also Brown, supra note 42, at 816.  The fact that
conflicts of interest run rampant is likely due in large part to the fact that they are
hard to prove and largely ignored by relevant stakeholders—large agencies, inde-
pendent agents, players’ associations, athletes, and professional sports leagues. See
Rosner, supra note 24, at 195-96.
44. See Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unin-
tended Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 785 (2006) (noting factors includ-
ing significant increase in overall number of agents).
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cent trend of consolidation in the sports agency industry has in-
creased this intense competition.45  This competition can lead to
agents acting in an overly aggressive manner to recruit and retain
clients.46  Complicating things even more is the fact that the extent
of duties owed by a sports agent to his clients depends, to a degree,
on whether the agent is also an attorney.
A. Conflict of Interest Authorities and Considerations for All
Sports Agents, Including Non-Attorney Sports Agents
The relationship between an athlete and an agent is based on
express contract.47  In major professional sports leagues, these rela-
tionships arise from representation agreements that describe the
nature of the services agents may perform on behalf of their princi-
pals (i.e., the athletes).48  They also articulate basic duties and obli-
gations that the parties owe to each other.49
The signing of an agency representation agreement results in a
fiduciary relationship between a sports agent and his client.50  The
obligations agents owe to their clients are thus based upon the
agency principle of agents aligning their incentives with the ath-
letes’.51  An agent owes the duty to exercise the utmost good faith,
loyalty, and honesty toward his principal.52  Further, agency law on
conflicts of interest dictates that an agent has an obligation to avoid
representing conflicting interests.53  This obligation remains firmly
intact unless the parties consent to the adverse representation and
45. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 103 (stating that increased consolidation
among sports agencies makes conflicts of interest “inevitable”).
46. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 69 (noting prevalence of agents offering
inducements to potential clients).
47. See Davis, supra note 44, at 789.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Darren Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regulation
Thereof, 7 DARTMOUTH L. J. 246, 246 (2009) (explaining that relationship results
from athlete providing consent to agent to act on athlete’s behalf yet be subject to
athlete’s control).  Note the Author’s references to an agent as “he,” “his,” and
“him” throughout this Article is due to the overwhelming percentage of males in
the industry.  In 2017, women constituted just 41 of the 795 certified NFLPA
agents. See Liz Mullen, Women Make Gains in NFL Agent Business, SPORTS BUS. J.
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/10/
02/Labor-and-Agents/Women-in-NFL.aspx [https://perma.cc/W684-9GFR].
51. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 79 (likening agent-athlete relationship R
to that of worker employed by professional service firm).
52. See Brown, supra note 42, at 824. R
53. See id.
9
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it is obvious that the agent can adequately represent the interests of
both clients.54
While common law fiduciary principles and obligations apply
to the agent-client relationship, they may not be the most appropri-
ate method of seeking to maintain and enforce the integrity of the
relationship.55  Thus, it is important to note the existence of other
authorities that regulate activities of agents and/or their prospec-
tive or current clients, including NCAA legislation, National Foot-
ball League Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) regulations and the
Uniform Athletes Agents Act (“UAAA”).56  Unfortunately, many see
this array of regulation as ineffective in that it does not serve the
needs of the athletes, leagues, universities, professional teams and
fans.57
By virtue of their status as a union, the NFLPA has broad au-
thority over agents.58  However, NFLPA rules only briefly and gen-
erally address the issue of conflicts of interest.59  NFLPA regulations
prohibit agents from engaging in activity that creates an actual or
potential conflict of interest with the effective representation of
players.60  However, NFLPA regulations lack specifics.  For exam-
ple, the NFLPA does not prohibit an agent from representing more
than one athlete on a team or from representing athletes and
coaches or team management simultaneously.61  Many believe
54. See id.
55. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 103 (seeking to introduce and enforce effec-
tive regulations regarding agents’ accreditation and activities); see also Jack Mar-
shall, The Unforgivable Conflict of Interest: Sports Agents, Robbing Their Ignorant Clients,
ETHICS ALARMS (Jan. 16, 2014, 11:11 PM), https://ethicsalarms.com/2014/01/16/
the-unforgivable-conflict-of-interest-sports-agents-robbing-their-ignorant-clients/
[https://perma.cc/KW2Q-378P] (describing conflict of interest that results from
agent representing two players vying for same contract).
56. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 87–88 (listing relevant authorities).
57. See id. at 88 (noting, for example, that states rarely enforce adopted UAAA
provisions).
58. See Davis, supra note 44, at 809 (denoting powers including determining
who can represent athletes and criteria under which agents may represent
athletes).
59. See Brown, supra note 422, at 833. R
60. See NFL Players Association, NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors,
NFLPA § 3B8 (2016), available at https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/
Default/PDFs/Agents/RegulationsAmendedAugust2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZQ7D-SCDP].
61. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 128.  NFLPA regulations require agents to R
disclose the representation of any coaches or front office personnel to player-cli-
ents at the signing of the representation agreement but do not prohibit dual repre-
sentation. See NFL Players Association, supra note 60, at § 3(A)(16). R
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NFLPA regulations are vague and unenforceable and have failed to
curb conduct of unethical agents.62
A number of states have adopted statutes governing the sports
agency industry.63  The UAAA, promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 2000, forms the
basis of many of these state statutes.64  The UAAA’s primary focus is
to protect the interests of educational institutions and, to a lesser
extent, protect student-athletes and provide uniformity among state
laws.65  Thus, it was not designed to combat all of the problems in
the sports agency industry.66  Many of these state statutes do not
include prohibitions of conflicts of interest, and the ones that do
only cover this issue cursorily.67  Further, states that have adopted
the UAAA or a version of it rarely enforce it.68  Unfortunately, the
state statutory schemes fail to provide a solution to the conflict of
interest problems in sports representation.69
B. Additional Conflict of Interest Authorities and Considerations
for Attorney-Agents
Attorneys comprise more than half of all agents representing
professional athletes.70  An agent-client relationship differs in many
ways from the traditional attorney-client relationship.71  Thus, many
attorneys acting as sports agents incorrectly assume their agent ac-
tivities are not governed by legal ethics rules.72  However, upon ad-
62. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 130 (arguing that regulatory language is
weak and inadequately neither defines violations nor provides for investigation
and enforcement); see also Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 94 (noting that players’
association regulations tend to focus on agents’ qualifications as opposed to regu-
lating their actions).
63. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 128 (noting that state statutes are aimed
primarily at protecting university student-athletes).
64. See Davis, supra note 44, at 802 (explaining that UAAA primarily protects
university whose student-athlete loses eligibility due to actions of agent).
65. See id. (noting that registration is required of agents who recruit student-
athlete to sign representation agreements).
66. See id. at 806 (explaining that legislation is reactive in that it provides ap-
paratus to sanction agents).
67. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 128 (concluding that there is minimal state
regulation of agents in dealings with professional athletes).
68. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 74 (citing review indicating lack of disci-
plinary action in most states).
69. See Davis, supra note 44, at 834 (suggesting that this could change should
agents and athletes participate in enforcement process).
70. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 123 (noting that it is not requirement for
agent to also be licensed attorney).
71. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 217 (explaining that agent-client relationship
is not traditional personal representative relationship).
72. See Brown, supra note 42, at 814.
11
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mission to a state bar, an attorney agrees to abide by its professional
responsibility rules.73  Further, many courts have held that ethical
rules govern the attorney-agent.74  While often ignored and unprov-
able, sports attorneys and their clients should closely scrutinize po-
tential conflicts of interest, if for no other reason than sports
attorneys’ clients, who are typically young athletes, often do not
possess the legal savvy or experience to make educated decisions
concerning legal representation and strategy.75
In addition to agency law discussed above, attorney-agents are
bound by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (hereinafter “Model Rules”), whichever is appli-
cable in their state.76  The vast majority of states have adopted the
Model Rules, which further the overriding values of the legal profes-
sion.77  One of the main policy considerations behind the conflict
of interest rules, which is also a fundamental tenet of the attorney-
client relationship, is unimpaired “zealous” loyalty to a client’s
interests.78
It is impossible to completely eliminate conflicts of interest
from the legal profession.79  Rather than focus on whether a con-
flict exists, the modern view of conflicts of interest acknowledges
that they are unavoidable, and instead centers on analysis of the
risk of material, adverse harm to either the quality of the attorney’s
representation or the attorney-client relationship.80
73. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 130 (explaining further that state bar au-
thorities may sanction attorney whose business practices run afoul of these rules).
Note, however, that state bars have not aggressively pursued the few claims athletes
have made against their agents. See Davis, supra note 44, at 800.
74. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 131 (citing and summarizing state court
cases from Arizona and Ohio).
75. See Brown, supra note 42, at 814.
76. See Davis, supra note 44, at 799 (explaining that violation of these stan-
dards may render attorney subject to discipline by state bar association).  The Au-
thor acknowledges there are some who feel that legal ethics rules may not
automatically apply to an attorney-agent, especially in situations where the agent
does not provide legal advice to the client. See e.g., Jack Marshall, The Truth About
Scott Boras, HARDBALL TIMES (Jan. 28, 2009), https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/the-
truth-about-scott-boras/ [https://perma.cc/YQ5C-CW69] (stating that it is unset-
tled whether agent’s activities constitute practice of law).  However, both case law
and ethics opinion state that attorneys acting as sports agents are bound by the
Model Code. See Connors, supra note 25, at 780 (noting that many agents who are
attorneys fail to follow Model Rules).
77. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 217 (specifying that 42 states as well as Dis-
trict of Columbia adopted Model Rules).
78. See Brown, supra note 42, at 827.
79. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 218 (citing “practical realities” of serving
more than one client).
80. See id. (explaining further that Model Rules require attorney to respond
appropriately when risk of actual harm to either client is substantial).
12
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Model Rule 1.7 is especially important in addressing conflicts of
interest faced by attorney-agents.81 Model Rule 1.7 establishes two
general conflict of interest provisions.82  First, under Model Rule
1.7(a), an attorney must decline representation of a client in a mat-
ter where the client’s interests are “directly adverse” to another, ex-
isting client.83  For example, a competition between two businesses
for a limited resource places two clients’ interests directly adverse to
each other.84  Thus, under Model Rule 1.7(a), the same attorney may
not represent both parties as one client would benefit only at the
cost of the other.85
Second, Model Rule 1.7(b) prohibits an attorney from repre-
senting a client in situations where the attorney’s abilities are “ma-
terially limited” by the attorney’s responsibilities to third parties or
another client, or where the attorney’s self-interest would conflict
with the client’s.86  Thus, Model Rule 1.7(b) addresses the quality of
the representation provided to each client and requires the likeli-
hood of a material limitation on the representation before resulting
in a prohibition.87  Applied less rigidly than 1.7(a), Model Rule
1.7(b) stresses that attorneys should maintain independence of
judgment unclouded by competing loyalties.88  The Comment to
Model Rule 1.7 further provides that an attorney may not advocate
against an individual who is represented by the attorney in another
matter, even when the matters are “wholly unrelated.”89
Some situations exist, however, where an attorney may re-
present clients with potentially conflicting interests without run-
ning afoul of the Model Rules so long as both parties provide
informed consent and the attorney reasonably concludes the con-
flicting representation will not be a detriment to either client.90
81. See id. at 219 (explaining that rule first requires attorneys to identify com-
peting interests that may impact judgment or capacity to be diligent and loyal to
his client).
82. See Brown, supra note 42, at 827.
83. See id. at 827-28.
84. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 220 (stating that two competing businesses
vying for same contract have interests that are directly adverse).
85. See id. at 220-21 (explaining that this type of relationship occurs often
when agents represent multiple NFL or NBA players as both leagues utilize salary
cap).
86. See Brown, supra note 42, at 828.
87. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 224 (describing Model Rule 1.7(b) language
as broader than 1.7(a)).
88. See id. (noting that Model Rule 1.7(b) has higher threshold than 1.7(a)
and thus is invoked less frequently).
89. See Brown, supra note 42, at 828.
90. See id.
13
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This furthers the personal autonomy of an individual to acquire the
best possible representation—a particularly acute need in the field
of sports agency, where the number of competent and experienced
attorneys and agents is limited.91  However, in situations where two
parties’ interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, rep-
resentation is nonconsentable.92  Failure to adhere to the Model
Rules can subject an attorney to state bar association discipline,
court disqualification from continuing the representation, civil lia-
bility and/or forfeiture of fees.93
C. Examples of Real or Potential Conflicts of Interest Involving
Sports Agents
As noted above, academics have written extensively about po-
tential conflicts of interest involving sports agents.  Below is a list of
commonly cited examples.
1. An Agent Representing Multiple Athletes on the Same Team, Notably
in Leagues with a Salary Cap94
In 1995, renowned agent Leigh Steinberg represented all three
Pittsburgh Steelers quarterbacks—Neil O’Donnell, Kordell Stewart
and Mike Tomczak.95  More recently, agent Gary Uberstine repre-
sented two kickers—David Buehler and Nick Folk—competing for
the Dallas Cowboys kicking job.96  Some agents acknowledge that
players represented by the same agent and competing for a job face
the possibility that the agent throws one client under the bus to
nudge the other into a better position.97
91. See id.
92. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 224 (citing example of multiple parties in
same negotiation).
93. See id. at 219 (noting existence of these possible ramifications while ac-
knowledging that Rule 1.7 provides little practical guidance to attorneys facing
conflicts of interest).
94. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 107–08 (stating that it is not difficult to
envision situation whereby agent must compromise demands of one client in order
to obtain more favorable outcome for another client); see also Neiman, supra note
27, at 123 (noting that some argue that representation of multiple athletes on
same team is not conflict of interest because market determines value).
95. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 212 (referring to simultaneous representa-
tion of all three quarterbacks as “difficult task”).
96. See Paresh Dave, Sports Agents Sometimes Have a Balancing Act with Clients,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2013), articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/25/sports/la-sp-1226-
same-agent-20131226 [https://perma.cc/5ZZA-EQEV] (noting that, ironically,
these two kickers became friends while competing for same job).
97. See id. (identifying one agent who maintains that no general manager has
ever called to ask agent’s opinion on which athlete to choose; rather, general man-
14
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Further, teams in salary cap leagues must pay players from a
limited fund, yet each athlete expects his agent to negotiate a con-
tract yielding the most money possible.98  Thus, a high salary for
one player may lead to a lower salary for another, especially if the
two play the same position.99  When an agent who represents multi-
ple clients on the same team negotiates a lucrative contract for one
client, it may lead to another client receiving an otherwise lower
salary or, worse yet, being cut from the team for salary cap pur-
poses.100  This is a delicate situation that agents must handle care-
fully, and it can result in an egregious failure to represent a client
with the client’s best interest in mind.101  When multiple clients
compete for the same job and/or try to obtain their maximum
share of a limited budget, the conflict may not be eliminated.102
When this is the case, the representation of two clients on the same
team in a salary cap league may not be undertaken regardless of
informed consent.103
2. An Agent Representing Multiple Players Who Play the Same Position,
Especially Those Who Have Similar Characteristics in Terms of
Talent Level, Experience, Success, and Size104
When star NFL quarterback Peyton Manning was a free agent
in the 2012 offseason, it was the “wildest free agent chase since the
Reggie White sweepstakes of 1993.”105  When the San Francisco
49ers emerged as contenders to sign Manning, things became very
ager asks agent to fill in blanks on injury history, a location preference, or target
contract value).
98. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 221 (noting that this situation occurs often).
99. See id. (referring to this scenario as “dilemma” for sports agents).
100. See id. at 212 (noting that this issue becomes exacerbated when clients
play same position).
101. See id. at 211 (suggesting that sports agents should only represent multi-
ple players on same team if they can answer this following question affirmatively:
“Can I the agent separate and carry out my functions as a sports agent as if the
players were represented by different agents?”).
102. See Marshall, supra note 55 (explaining that in this scenario, attorney
knows that performance of duties for one client will affect performance of duties
owed to other client).
103. See Brown, supra note 42, at 817 (referring to scenario as win-lose, zero-
sum situation in which one client wins at other client’s expense).
104. See Joe Fortenbaugh, Conflicting Interests for Agent of Manning, Smith, NAT’L
FOOTBALL POST (Mar. 17, 2012, 8:21 PM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/football/nfl/story/2013-03-17/conflict-of-interest-tom-condon/53594502/
1 [https://perma.cc/S4DV-9FN9] (predicting that either Smith or Manning would
“wind up getting the short end of the stick” while Condon collected three percent
of both players’ new contracts).
105. Id. (noting that Denver Broncos and Tennessee Titans believed it was
two-team competition to sign Manning until 49ers became involved).
15
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interesting for incumbent 49ers starting quarterback and former
number one overall draft pick Alex Smith.106  At the time, it was
rumored that the 49ers and Smith were negotiating a lucrative con-
tract extension.107  When the 49ers became involved with Manning,
however, the 49ers put negotiations with Smith on hold, causing
many to believe that Smith became a 49ers afterthought.108
In situations like these, Smith’s agent bears responsibility for
taking charge and creating leverage.109  The problem, however, was
that the individual responsible for doing everything in his power to
protect Smith’s best interests was the same man tasked with provid-
ing those services to Manning.110  Like Steinberg before him, agent
Tom Condon represented a number of successful NFL
quarterbacks at the time, including Smith and Manning.111  It ap-
peared at the time that there was no way for Condon to fulfill his
obligations to either Smith or Manning without causing harm to
the other.112  In fact, longtime agent Jack Bechta noted at the time:
It’s just human nature to play favorites.  But when an
agent represents two players vying for the same job, there
is a moral obligation to do what’s in the best interest of
both players.  However, what may be in the best interest of
one client may not be in the best interest of the other.113
In reality, this situation is common despite the fact that it rep-
resents an un-waivable conflict of interest that technically could
subject an attorney-agent to state bar discipline and perhaps consti-
tute immoral and unethical behavior.114
106. See id. (noting that if 49ers would have signed Manning, Smith could
have signed elsewhere, but Smith had led 49ers to 13-3 regular season record and
spot in conference championship game in previous season and forged strong
bonds with his 49ers teammates over previous six years).
107. See id. (explaining that remaining with 49ers was likely in Smith’s best
interests as opposed to starting over with new organization and offensive scheme).
108. See id.
109. See id. (noting that Smith paid Condon three percent of his contract in
exchange for Condon’s services).
110. See id. (describing Condon’s simultaneous representation of Manning
and Smith as “precarious position”).
111. See Connors, supra note 25, at 778 (describing scenario where Steinberg
represented all three Pittsburgh Steelers quarterbacks); see also Fortenbaugh, supra
note 104 (noting that Condon is well-respected and successful, having represented
numerous first-round draft picks and negotiated some of most lucrative free agent
contracts in NFL history).
112. See id. (stating that Condon was bound to fail one client).
113. See id.
114. See Marshall, supra note 76 (using example of baseball agent Scott Boras
and his simultaneous representation and negotiating on behalf of multiple players
16
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3. An Agent Representing Similarly Talented and Sized Draft-Eligible
Players at the Same Position in a Draft Class115
A recent example of two players at the same position jockeying
for a draft selection slot occurred in the 2012 NFL draft when
quarterbacks Andrew Luck and Robert Griffin III competed for the
number one overall selection, owned by the Indianapolis Colts.116
If agency law and the existence of a fiduciary relationship impose
duties including good faith and avoidance of conflicts of interest, it
might seem clear that one agent could not ethically represent both
quarterbacks and market one at the other’s expense to the Colts.117
For example:
One of the most important roles that an agent can have
on [rookies’] behalf is promotion to various scouts and
other NFL personnel.  Knowing that a rookie player’s
agent may also be doing the same for (or better) for said
player’s direct competition for a contract, roster spot, etc.
at the same position and in the same draft class, is likely
not a scenario that a rookie player wants to contemplate
and undergo to their possible detriment.118
with New York Yankees).  Manning eventually signed with the Denver Broncos,
where he resurrected his elite Hall of Fame career. See Vinnie Iyer, What If . . .
Peyton Manning Had Picked 49ers Over Broncos?, SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 16, 2014),
www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/peyton-manning-49ers-broncos-week-7-tim-
tebow-jim-harbaugh-colin-kaepernick-alex-smith/15cnu4dywcnmu1mbw4263arakr
[https://perma.cc/D8AH-ZN8Y]. Smith re-signed with the 49ers for three years
and $24 million. See id.  The 49ers traded Smith the following offseason. See id.
115. See Brennan, supra note 40 (discussing agent recruiting generally and
characterizing the subject scenario as “likely” conflict of interest due to importance
of agent’s promotion of his client to NFL personnel).
116. See Associated Press, NFL Draft: Will Luck or Griffin Be Better NFL QB? CBS
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012, 1:38 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nfl-draft-will-
luck-or-griffin-be-better-nfl-qb/ [https://perma.cc/PDQ6-APBS] (speculating that
Indianapolis Colts would draft Luck first overall).
117. The two quarterbacks signed with different agents.  Luck signed with his
uncle. See Antonio Gonzalez, Andrew Luck’s Uncle to Serve as QB’s Agent, NFL.COM
(Aug. 15, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d82617494/
article/andrew-lucks-uncle-to-serve-as-qbs-agent [https://perma.cc/P7GS-
N44P?type=image]. Griffin signed with Ben Dogra, then of CAA. See Sports Agent
Blog, Robert Griffin III Hires Ben Dogra of Creative Artists Agency (CAA), BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 12, 2012, 6:22 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/robert-griffin-iii-hires-
ben-dogra-of-creative-artists-agency-caa-2012-1 [https://perma.cc/89RU-3HT9].
The Colts ultimately selected Luck first overall and the Washington Redskins
traded up in the draft to select Griffin. See Bill Barnwell, The Rise and Fall of the
2012 NFL Draft, GRANTLAND (Sept. 25, 2014), grantland.com/the-triangle/the-rise-
and-fall-of-the-2012-nfl-draft/ [https://perma.cc/3V7Q-4V3M].
118. Brennan, supra note 40.
17
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4. Agents Placing Bets on Success—or Lack of—for their Client119
In one publicized incident, an employee of the agency repre-
senting tennis star Roger Federer, although not the agent of record
for Federer, allegedly placed large bets on Federer using inside in-
formation the employee obtained from Federer.120  Agents are
privy to inside information from clients and should use it to further
the client’s interests—not their own.121  In this case, the individual
placing the bets worked for agency IMG Worldwide, a very large
sports agency.122  IMG represented numerous other tennis athletes
as well as athletes in other sports and actually owned a piece of
several tennis tournaments.123  “They are as much a part of sports as
the leagues are, yet a league employee would never get away with
gambling on a sport he or she has a financial interest in.”124  Thus,
the mere hint of a corrupting influence is enough to call the integ-
rity of the sport into question.125
5. An Agent Employed as a High School Coach126
During the 2011 NFL lockout, Hamden Hall, a private high
school in Connecticut, hired agent Joe Linta as its head football
coach.127  At the time, Linta represented approximately 40 profes-
sional football players, including Baltimore Ravens quarterback Joe
Flacco.128  A conflict of interest could arise should one of the stu-
dent-athletes eventually become NFL-caliber and feel a sense of loy-
119. See Dashiell Bennett, Sports Agents Should Not Be Gambling on Their Own
Clients (But They Definitely Are), BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2010, 10:29 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/sports-agent-admits-to-betting-on-his-own-client-2010-10
[https://perma.cc/92TL-66XS] (acknowledging that agent regulations are lax and
nearly impossible to enforce).
120. See id. (noting that, ironically, this agency employee actually lost $40,000
betting on Federer to win the French Open final).
121. See id. (describing several previous examples where individuals involved
with sports gambled on sports).
122. See id. (referring to IMG Worldwide as “the world’s biggest sports
agency”).
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See Bryan Toporek, NFL Agent Moonlighting as High School Football Coach,
EDUC. WEEK (May 11, 2011, 1:39 PM), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/
schooled_in_sports/2011/05/nfl_agent_moonlighting_as_high_school_football_
coach.html [https://perma.cc/3JV7-L74Q] (noting that high school headmaster
who employed agent as coach in subject example believed there was no conflict of
interest because agent did not represent high school players).
127. See id. (noting that Linta’s sons played on team).
128. See id. (noting that Linta did not leave his roster of clients when he be-
came coach and his clients remained his first priority).
18
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alty to his former high school coach, making it more likely that the
athlete will sign with Linta.129
6. An Agent Representing Athletes as well as Coaches or Management
Personnel with Roster Decision-Making Authority130
Representing a coach and player for the same team “doesn’t
pass our smell test,” according to agent Steve Kauffman, who exclu-
sively represents basketball coaches and executives.131  Thus, the
National Basketball Players Association (“NBPA”) has a rule ban-
ning simultaneous representation of coaches/management and
players.132  This rule recognizes and prevents a conflict of interest
for the agent should a player and coach dispute over a lack of play-
ing time or role on the team as it precludes the agent from being
placed in the middle of the dispute.133
This rule also acknowledges that some coaches, like manage-
ment personnel, play a role in roster decisions.134  Individuals with
authority to make roster decisions have interests adverse to players
during negotiations.135  Thus, it would be a conflict of interest for
an agent to represent both an individual with authority to make
roster decisions (e.g., a coach or general manager) and a player on
the team simultaneously.136  The rule protects coaches because it
129. See id. (disclosing that Linta likely did not take coaching position with ill
intentions; after all, he had previous coaching experience).
130. See Neiman, supra note 27, at 123 (explaining that this conflict is one that
is likely non-consentable).
131. Dave, supra note 96 (providing example that player may feel he deserves
more playing time while the coach seeks to bench the player).
132. See Ken Berger, NBPA Mounting Crackdown Against Agents Over Conflicts of
Interest, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/nbpa-
mounting-crackdown-against-agents-over-conflicts-of-interest/ [https://perma.cc/
CM2B-US76?type=image] (noting that rule has been in effect for long time but
rarely enforced until recently when NBPA’s executive committee voted to mount
enforcement campaign).
133. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 214 (citing NBPA REGULATIONS GOV-
ERNING PLAYER AGENTS § 3B(f) (2018), available at http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr
32v9qof-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/OmittedPages
NBPA_AgentRegulations_050118.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XE-RWXQ]).
134. See Connors, supra note 25, at 776 (using former Denver Broncos head
coach Mike Shanahan as example).
135. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 108 (explaining that players demand high-
est salary possible while coaches align themselves with management and seek to
pay lesser amount).
136. See Connors, supra note 25, at 776 (stating that agent Bob LaMont made
good decision to no longer represent athletes and exclusively represent coaches,
who typically have guaranteed contracts while professional football athletes do
not).
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eliminates any appearance of uneven treatment for a player who
shares the same agent as the coach.137
While the NFLPA requires an agent who signs an athlete to
notify the athlete of NFL management personnel and coaches rep-
resented by the agent, the NFLPA does not prohibit this dual repre-
sentation.138  In failing to do so, the NFLPA is the only players
association that fails to recognize that this dual representation con-
stitutes a conflict of interest for agents that should not occur.139
Many agents take advantage of the absence of such a rule to benefit
their own bottom line.140
The most prevalent conflict of interest in the coaching profes-
sion is an offshoot of agents concurrently representing coaches and
players.141  When an agent represents both coaches and athletes, it
is a conflict of interest for the agent to use the coach to try to access
athletes for recruiting purposes.142
7. An Agent Representing Both Coaches and University Athletics
Directors Responsible for Hiring Decisions143
In 2013, University of Memphis athletics director Tom Bowen
renegotiated then-head men’s basketball coach Josh Pastner’s con-
tract.144  Both utilized the same agent at the time.145  A state investi-
gation and audit found no evidence of Bowen either receiving a
137. See Liz Mullen, Coaches Union Likes NBPA’s Decision to Enforce Agent Rule,
SPORTS BUS. J. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Is-
sues/2016/02/29/Labor-and-Agents/Labor-and-Agents.aspx [https://perma.cc/
4SXH-QZQC] (stating that National Basketball Coaches Association applauded
NBPA’s recent decision to enforce rule prohibiting simultaneous representation of
coaches and players because NBA is “tight-knit family”).
138. See NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS,
supra note 60, at § 3(A)(16); see also Rosner, supra note 24, at 241.
139. See id. (noting that general counsel for NFLPA has made efforts to adopt
similar rule as that in other professional league players associations).
140. See Jason Belzer & Darren Heitner, An Offer They Should Refuse: Why Con-
flicts of Interest Raised by Dual Representation Among Player Agents is a Major Threat to the
NCAA and Professional Leagues, 2 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 1, 2 (2012) (explain-
ing that, in doing so, agents take advantage of leagues, teams, and players).
141. See Blair, supra note 40 (using example of coach whose agent works at
large agencies like CAA or IMG, predicting that agents from these agencies who
represent players will try to access players through their coach).
142. See id. (describing this conflict of interest as “undeniable”).
143. See id. (concluding that there is no way one person can ethically
represent both sides of negotiation).
144. See Associated Press, Audit: Memphis AD Had Conflict During Pastner Negoti-
ation, USA TODAY (July 10, 2017, 6:47 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaab/2017/07/10/audit-memphis-ad-had-conflict-during-pastner-negotia
tion/103588028/ [https://perma.cc/QQL8-XFLN] (stating Pastner received raise
from $1.7 million annually to $2.65 million).
145. See id.
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benefit from the agent in exchange for Pastner’s raise or inappro-
priately sharing information.146  However, the university’s Board of
Regents described the situation as a conflict of interest, recognizing
that one person cannot adequately represent both sides of a
negotiation.147
8. An Agent Representing Multiple Coaches148
One can often map a list of an agent’s clients like a family
tree.149  For example, the top branch of the aforementioned Uber-
stine’s tree could include former University of Southern California
and current Seattle Seahawks head football coach Pete Carroll.150
Below the top branch are smaller branches of that head coach’s
current and former assistant coaches.  In Carroll’s case this could
include current Florida Atlantic University head coach Lane Kiffin,
current Louisiana State University head coach Ed Orgeron, and for-
mer Atlanta Falcons offensive coordinator Steve Sarkisian.151
In November 2013, two of Uberstine’s clients vied for the same
position.152  Both Orgeron and Sarkisian sought and were candi-
dates for the University of Southern California head coaching posi-
tion, begging the question of how Uberstine fulfilled his obligations
to both clients.153  Uberstine stated, “If a conflict develops at some
point, you have a discussion about it.  More often than not, they
have a longstanding relationship and the client values that and be-
lieves the agent can represent them in an appropriate manner.”154
146. See id. (noting Pastner’s updated contract was not submitted to Tennes-
see Board of Regents for approval as required for contracts exceeding $100,000).
147. See id.; see also Blair, supra note 40 (advising that coach whose agent also
represents athletics directors should find new agent who exclusively represents
coaches).
148. See id. (explaining that situation is common).
149. See Dave, supra note 96 (noting that scenario happens several times an-
nually when agent has multiple clients vying for single position).
150. See id. (explaining that Carroll and Uberstine have grown close, with
Uberstine serving as advisor for Carroll’s charity).
151. See id. (noting that Uberstine came recommended to Carroll’s assistant
coaches when some of them were being considered for head coaching positions).
152. See id. (noting this was not first time Uberstine dealt with scenario where
two of his clients competed for same job; it happened in 2007 when Kiffin and
Sarkisian competed for Raiders coaching job).
153. See id. (noting that these entanglements expose deep clientele of select
few agents and their ability to leverage connections to steer some of their talent to
particular teams).
154. Id.
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Similar situations arise a few times every year.155  Consider
super-agent Sexton, for example.156  He currently represents eleven
of the fourteen SEC head football coaches alone.157
9. Advising the Amateur Athlete
It is not uncommon for an underclass, draft-eligible football
student-athlete to “test the waters” and consider leaving school early
to enter the NFL draft and, in the course of his due diligence, meet
with an agent to learn more about the business side of professional
football.  Although amateur football student-athletes with college
eligibility remaining may not enter a representation agreement
with an agent, they may consult with an agent on the prospects of
foregoing eligibility and entering the draft without forfeiting
eligibility.158
However, an attorney-agent providing such counsel faces a po-
tential conflict of interest when advising the student-athlete on his
decision.159  The Comment to Model Rule 1.7 states that an attor-
ney’s own interests are not to have an adverse effect upon the rep-
resentation of a client.160  If the attorney-agent advises the student-
athlete to turn professional, the agent may soon have a new client
paying fees.161  However, it may be in the best interests of the stu-
dent-athlete to return to his or her university and remain an ama-
teur for another season.162  The signing of the new client would
normally be in the interest of the attorney-agent, therefore the at-
torney-agent in the position of advising a college athlete regarding
an early entry decision may face a conflict of interest.
Sports media and academics have covered the above scenarios
in depth.  Section IV examines a scenario yet to receive much atten-
tion—the recruitment of a coach’s players by the coach’s agent.
155. See id.
156. See Dennis Dodd, Man Behind the Money, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/feature/24963891/man-behind-the-
money [https://perma.cc/DQV7-6ABY] (describing Sexton as one of most power-
ful men in sports).
157. See Barnett, supra note 15.  While his client list provides several examples
in this Article, readers should not take this Article as an indictment on Sexton or
his character.  The Author’s interactions with Sexton have all been respectful, and
many consider him not only a top coach-agent, but one of the top agents in the
country. See e.g. Belzer, supra note 140, at 10.  Sexton’s client list speaks for itself.
158. See Brown, supra note 42, at 822.
159. See id.
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R.1 1.7 cmt. 10 (2018).
161. See Brown, supra note 42, at 822.
162. See id.
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IV. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING FROM AGENTS
RECRUITING THEIR COACH-CLIENTS’ DRAFT-ELIGIBLE
UNDERCLASSMEN
Most NCAA football coaches have agents.163  This is logical and
appropriate given the amount of money that college coaches earn
today.164  There are a number of conflicts of interest that could po-
tentially arise as a result of college coaches having agents who re-
cruit the coaches’ athletes as clients.
First, when it comes time for the student-athlete to begin his
agent selection process, either at the conclusion of his athletic eligi-
bility or when considering leaving school to enter the draft early, it
is natural for the athlete to seek counsel from a coach.  The stu-
dent-athlete and coach relationship could date as far back as high
school when the coach began recruiting the student-athlete.  The
coach both successfully recruited the student-athlete and helped
develop him over the course of at least four years to the point
where the athlete is on the cusp of a professional football career.
Further, the coach may be one of the few individuals who the stu-
dent-athlete knows who utilizes an agent.  Second, it can be natural
for the coach to recommend the services of the coach’s agent to his
student-athlete.  If the coach trusts his agent, it may be better than
the alternative of the student-athlete signing with an untrustworthy
agent.165  Third, it can be natural for the coach’s agent to recruit
student-athletes who play or played for the coach.  Finally, given the
relationship between coaches and student-athletes, the student-ath-
lete may choose the coach’s agent based largely on the trust the
coach seemingly places in his agent.
What, if anything, is wrong with the growing and seemingly
natural trend whereby a football student-athlete signs with his
coach’s agent?  The answer to this question depends on several fac-
tors, including who is asked (e.g., the involved agent, competing
agents, the NCAA, or the student-athlete) and the facts of each case
(e.g., whether the head coach presented the student-athlete with
163. See Justin VanFulpen, Should College Football Coaches Have Agents?, THE
PODYUM (June 16, 2017), https://recruit.thepodyum.com/articles/339-should-col
lege-football-coaches-have-agents [https://perma.cc/5ZZN-JAGH] (examining
whether coaches should have agents).
164. See Connors, supra note 25, at 772 (differentiating between college
coaches who tend to make guaranteed money and professional football athletes,
whose contracts typically are not guaranteed).
165. See Fowler, supra note 34 (relaying feelings of anonymous BCS-level ath-
letic director).
23
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other recommendations or only endorsed his agent).  Some are not
bothered by student-athletes choosing their coaches’ agents.
For example, Texas Tech athletics director Kirby Hocutt
sought to ensure that the student-athletes at his university in these
situations made their own decisions.  Hocutt saw the scenario play
out when former Texas Tech tight end Jace Amaro was drafted in
the second round of the NFL draft in 2014, while represented by
Erik Burkhardt of Select Sports Group, the same agent and agency
that represented head coach Kliff Kingsbury, the head coach at the
time.166
Vann McElroy of Select Sports Group has stated that his agency
is careful about the player-coach dynamic and does not use its con-
nection to coaches to land players.167  McElroy argues that repre-
senting a player’s coach can put the agency at a disadvantage. He
stated, “[t]hey’ll say that a guy is trying to sway a player because that
coach has a player, and that’s not always a comfortable thing.”168
Regardless, Select Sports briefly represented former West Virginia
University quarterback Geno Smith before Smith switched to Jay-Z’s
Roc Nation agency.169  Select Sports represented West Virginia’s
head coach at the time, Dana Holgorsen, when Smith selected Se-
lect Sports to represent him.170
Those uncomfortable with the scenario whereby a coach’s
agent recruits the coach’s athletes include Big 12 commissioner
Bob Bowlsby, Duke University head football coach David Cutcliffe
and, generally, players-only agents.  Referring to the situation, Bowl-
sby stated,“[i]t’s an absolute conflict of interest.  A rule or some sort
of accepted practice to prohibit it would be appropriate . . . .  Even
under the best circumstances it doesn’t pass the smell test.”171
Coach Cutcliffe agreed and stated, “[t]hat’s something that needs
to be looked at.”172  As a result, Cutcliffe never recommends an
agent to a student-athlete in his program.173  Not only do agents
166. See id. (noting Hocutt talks with parties involved to ensure they under-
stand parameters with coach-player-agent overlap).
167. See id. (quoting McElroy as saying: “I think everybody knows the bounda-
ries of that [relationship]”).
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. (noting McElroy’s statement that his agency’s representation of
coaches adds credibility to company but company doesn’t use connection to land
clients).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. (noting that Cutcliffe’s current home state taught college football
harsh lesson through former University of North Carolina assistant football coach
24
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who represent both coaches and their players receive a de facto
endorsement of their services, they may receive exclusive access to
players.174  Further, players-only agents contend that agents who re-
present coaches may receive access to pro days and practices at
schools that prohibit other agents from attending them.175  A
coach’s agent may be placed on the same floor as the student-ath-
letes in a team hotel for a bowl game.176  Either of these scenarios
provides the agent who has the coach as a client with the advantage
of coveted access to potential player-clients.177
In order to fully understand any potential ethical or NCAA
ramifications resulting from this practice, it is important to first ex-
amine and understand the agent recruiting process generally.
A. The Process of Agents Recruiting College Student-Athletes
Well-known football agent Leigh Steinberg’s definition of a
successful sports agent is someone with great clients.178  Thus,
recruiting is the lifeblood of the sports agency business.179  Former
agent and NFL executive Andrew Brandt describes agent recruiting
as attempting to convince a young man he should sign with him
instead of the many others trying to sign him.180  To football agent
Pat Dye, Jr., recruiting is a job interview in which he must sell him-
self to the student-athlete, his potential client.181
John Blake when NCAA penalized university as part of wide-ranging investigation
stemming from charges that Blake steered student-athletes to agent).
174. See Belzer, supra note 140, at 10 (explaining that agent’s coaching clients
may not outright recommend him to coach’s student-athletes but coach in effect
provides de facto endorsement by providing increased access to student-athletes).
175. See Fowler, supra note 34 (referring to such access as “inherent” advan-
tage).  A college pro day is where NFL teams put draft eligible players through
workouts and testing in advance of the NFL draft. See Greg Gabriel, Why College Pro
Days are Important for NFL Draft Prospects, BLEACHER REP. (Mar. 6, 2014), https://
bleacherreport.com/articles/1983716-why-college-pro-days-are-important-for-nfl-
draft-prospects [https://perma.cc/3JR2-KAM9].
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Leigh Steinberg, How to be a Great Sports Agent—Signing Prospects Part I,
FORBES (Dec. 3, 2016, 11:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/
2016/12/03/how-to-be-a-great-sports-agent-signing-prospects-part-i?#7f5df1451d92
[https://perma.cc/A3JS-AUJE] (referring to successful recruiting as skill every
agent must master).
179. See Andrew Brandt, Football’s Other Recruiting, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec.
19, 2013), https://www.si.com/2013/12/19/nfl-agents-recruit-draft-prospects
[https://perma.cc/84LK-YCYA].
180. See id. (explaining that time period between end of college football’s
regular season and bowl season is “go time” for agents in their pursuit of new
clients).
181. See Kevin Scarbinsky, Choosing an Agent: The Other Kind of Recruiting,
AL.COM (Mar. 11, 2012, 2:20 PM), https://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/
25
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However, agent recruiting has been described by one football
agent as “a shark tank without any lifeguards.”182  This is due in
large part to the fact that there are many NFLPA certified agents
vying to represent the few draftees and players who will be un-
drafted to the NFL.183  Thus, agents look for and often need angles
into a player’s life during the recruiting process.184  For Dye, Jr., the
business is all about relationships.185  The usual ways into a student-
athlete’s agent selection process include relationships with (or rep-
resentation of) a school’s coach or coaches, representation of play-
ers that the student-athlete knows and/or trusts, representation of
players from the student-athlete’s school, representation of players
from the student-athlete’s hometown, or being a well-known name
in the industry.186  Make no mistake—agents use the fact that they
represent a student-athlete’s coach as a recruiting tool when trying
to convince the student-athlete to become a client.187  Perhaps that
is why an agent like Uberstine, agent for former University of
Southern California head coach Pete Caroll, enjoyed success
recruiting and signing players from the school, including wide re-
ceiver Curtis Conway and tight end Jordan Cameron.188
The agent selection process is extremely important for student-
athletes.  Most agents are honest and professional, but many do
03/post_345.html [https://perma.cc/Y4DJ-EUP8] (describing Dye’s background,
which includes being son of Auburn University’s former head football coach and
obtaining his law degree).
182. Id. (explaining that not all agents follow relevant authorities, and conse-
quence for agents who follow rules is that they get later start on developing rela-
tionships with potential clients).
183. See Steinberg, supra note 178 (noting that in 2017, there were nearly
1,000 NFLPA certified agents vying for representation of many less draftees and
players who would go undrafted).
184. See Brandt, supra note 179 (explaining that cold calls do not work due to
competitiveness of business).
185. See Scarbinsky, supra note 181 (providing example of Dye, Jr., who is ex-
ample of “Auburn grad” signing former University of Alabama football student-
athlete through leveraging relationships with people associated with University of
Alabama).
186. See Brandt, supra note 179.
187. See Zach Lowe, Double Dribble: The Conflict of Interest Concern with Agents
Representing Players and Coaches, GRANTLAND (July 13, 2015), grantland.com/the-tri
angle/double-dribble-the-conflict-of-interest-concern-with-agents-representing-
players-and-coaches [https://perma.cc/TV2A-G8B8?type=image] (citing examples
of NBA team rosters on which multiple players and head coach utilize same
agent).
188. See Dave, supra note 96 (providing example of secret contract between
former NBA player Joe Smith and Minnesota Timberwolves that resulted in sanc-
tions for Timberwolves and NBA declaring Smith to be free agent).
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more harm than good.189  For any athlete, there is nothing better
than an honest agent—and nothing worse than a dishonest
agent.190  The selection process can be grueling and complicated,
with former University of Alabama running back and third overall
pick in the 2012 NFL draft Trent Richardson saying it was “probably
the hardest thing ever.”191  The process can overwhelm student-ath-
letes, who often receive fifty text messages and twenty-five calls a day
from agents seeking to represent them.192
Further, the relevant players in the agent recruiting game—
student-athletes, agents, family members of student-athletes and
coaches—must learn and follow NFLPA regulations, NCAA rules,
university guidelines, and state laws that regulate the agent recruit-
ment process.193  However, the NCAA does not have power over
agents—that is the NFLPA’s purview.194  And the NFLPA does not
regulate student-athletes—that’s the NCAA’s job.195  To complicate
things further, while the NCAA does not prohibit contact between
agents and student-athletes, universities may have policies restrict-
ing contact.196  For example, the University of Alabama allows con-
tact between agents and juniors after December 1 (or the SEC
Championship Game if Alabama is involved) “with the head coach’s
permission, depending on final exams and the bowl practice
schedule.”197
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the aforementioned Richardson
played at the University of Alabama for head coach Nick Saban and
then signed with Saban’s agent, Jimmy Sexton, upon leaving school
189. See Anderson, supra note 39 (explaining that agent’s harm can be bla-
tantly wrong or subtle scheme, and providing examples of each).
190. See id. (providing examples of agents’ dishonest acts).
191. See Scarbinsky, supra note 181 (explaining that agent selection is hard
because agents tend to tell “you what you want to hear”).
192. See id. (likening agent recruiting to college coaches recruiting high
school athletes).
193. See id. Note the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act of 2004 is a
federal statute, the goal of which is intended to regulate sports agent conduct dur-
ing the student-athlete recruitment period.  Heitner, supra note 50, at 246–47.
However, it is widely considered weak and thus the author does not include it in
the Article. Id.
194. See Scarbinsky, supra note 181.  NCAA regulations can carry little weight
with agents since they are not employed by an NCAA member university. See Mas-
teralexis, supra note 26, at 89.
195. See Scarbinsky, supra note 181.
196. See id. (noting that universities may have more restrictive rules governing
contact between agents and student-athletes).
197. Id.
27
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early and declaring for the draft.198  The following section exam-
ines whether this scenario constitutes a conflict of interest for the
coach’s agent.
B. It is a Conflict of Interest When Agents Recruit and Sign
their Coach-Clients’ Draft-Eligible Underclassmen
When agents recruit draft-eligible underclassmen, the agents’
overall message tends to be that the player should leave school and
enter the draft early.199  For example, former Clemson University
and NFL linebacker Keith Adams heard from forty different agents
that a team would draft him in the first round of the 2001 NFL
draft.200  On draft day, however, an NFL team did not select Adams
until the draft’s seventh round.201  Under NCAA rules, once a foot-
ball student-athlete goes through the NFL draft, perhaps due in
large part to the urging of an agent (or agents), the student-athlete
may not return to his university and compete in football, regardless
of whether or where an NFL team selected him.202  The loss of a
student-athlete in this situation also deprives the coaching staff of
the student-athlete’s contributions to the team in upcoming
seasons.203
198. See id. (noting that, under University of Alabama’s rules, agents must re-
ceive head coach’s permission to contact student-athletes during certain times).
199. See Connors, supra note 25, at 768–69 (explaining that student-athletes
tend to listen only to those agents who urge them to leave school early and enter
draft).
200. See id. at 769 (describing Adams as “perfect example” of junior who lis-
tens only to agents who encourage student-athlete to leave school early for draft).
201. See id. (noting that Adams failed to take advantage of NFL process
whereby it provides juniors with projected draft round in advance of draft to assist
them in making informed decision whether to leave school early).
202. See Richard Johnson, Should Players Who Aren’t Drafted or Signed be Allowed
to Return to School?  Why Not?, SB NATION (May 1, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://
www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/4/28/17280426/undrafted-players-
ncaa-basketball-commission-reports-agents [https://perma.cc/9HVY-JTPZ] (argu-
ing that student-athletes who go through NFL draft and are not drafted or signed
should be permitted to return to school with collegiate eligibility).  Note the
NCAA recently implemented changes that will permit some men’s basketball stu-
dent-athletes to return to school after entering and going through the NBA draft.
See Jason Belzer, NCAA Unveils New Rules for College Basketball, But They May Wind Up
Deepening Old Problems, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jasonbelzer/2018/08/08/ncaa-college-basketball-rules/#26fce0fc6115
[https://perma.cc/U4UE-G53S].
203. The reader should note that this Article does not argue that it is a con-
flict of interest for a coach-agent to recruit a coach-client’s former player, even one
who just recently exhausted his eligibility to compete under NCAA rules.  If a
coach-agent recruits and signs such a former player from a coach-client’s program,
the fact that the player has no remaining competition eligibility means he may not
compete for the coach again.  Thus, the interests of the coach and player are not
adverse and the agent may take on simultaneous representation of the coach and
28
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By signing a representation agreement with his coach’s agent,
the underclassman forfeits his remaining college athletics eligibility
under NCAA rules and can no longer compete for the coach.204
Thus, the agent adds to his client list but weakens the coach’s team.
In doing so, the agent fails to align his incentives with those of his
client (i.e., the coach), fails to fulfill his duty to exercise the utmost
good faith and loyalty to the coach, and fails to avoid representing
conflicting interests.  Therefore, the agent’s recruitment and sign-
ing of a draft-eligible underclassman from a client’s team results in
a conflict of interest under agency law.  This is true regardless of
whether the agent is an attorney.
There are additional implications for attorney-agents who en-
gage in this practice.  Recall that one of the main considerations of
conflict of interest rules is unimpaired “zealous” loyalty to a client’s
interests.205  Under Model Rule 1.7(a), an attorney must decline rep-
resentation of a client in a matter where the client’s interests are
“directly adverse” to another existing client.206  It is hard to see how
a coach’s agent who recruits and signs a client’s underclassman can
maintain that he was zealously loyal to the coach when, due to the
agent’s actions (signing a representation agreement with the
player), the underclassman may no longer play for the coach.
Further, as stated above, Model Rule 1.7(b) prohibits an attor-
ney from representing a client in situations where the attorney’s
abilities are “materially limited” by the attorney’s responsibilities to
another client or where the attorney’s own self-interest would con-
flict with the client’s.207  Again, Model Rule 1.7(b) addresses the
quality of the representation provided to each client, stressing that
attorneys should maintain independence of judgment unclouded
by competing loyalties.208  By signing away a client’s player, the at-
torney-agent’s self-interests in adding to his client list conflicts with
former player free from implication of legal conflict of interest law and guidelines
(although some such as Commissioner Bowlsby and Coach Cutcliffe express moral
concerns referenced in Section IV above).  There is, however, still a potential for
NCAA rules implications when coach-agents recruit their coach’s players.  For fur-
ther discussion of these issues, see infra notes 214–241 and accompanying text.
204. See NCAA, 2017-18 Division I Manual § 12.3.1 (2017), available at http://
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D118.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4J7G-US8R] [hereinafter NCAA Manual 2017-2018].
205. See Brown, supra note 42, at 827.
206. See id. at 827–28
207. See id. at 828 (providing example that attorney may not advocate against
individual who attorney represents in another matter, even if the matters are
“wholly unrelated”).
208. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 224 (explaining that there must be material
limitation on representation before Rule 1.7(b) can be invoked).
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the coach’s interest in fielding the best possible team.  Further, by
fielding a weakened team, the coach may lose more games, making
it more difficult for the agent to help the coach keep his job and/or
find a new job.  Thus, when an agent recruits a client’s underclass-
men, the agent engages in a practice that Model Rule 1.7(b) seeks
to prohibit.
Further, agents may not circumvent this conflict of interest via
waiver.  As stated above, an attorney may represent clients with po-
tentially conflicting interests without running afoul of the Model
Rules so long as both parties provide informed consent and the at-
torney reasonably concludes the conflicting representation will not
be a detriment to either client.209  A part of the analysis includes an
objective examination in that a reasonably prudent and competent
attorney must agree with the attorney-agent that the attorney-
agent’s relationship with the coach would not be affected.210  A rea-
sonably prudent and competent attorney would agree that the sign-
ing of one of the coach’s players is fundamentally antagonistic to
the coach’s interests in retaining his most talented players and field-
ing the most competitive team, and thus the attorney-agent may not
proceed with signing the player.
Consent may not even be a consideration, however.  A situa-
tion is non-consentable where the concern for the protection of the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship outweighs the desire for
client autonomy.211  This occurs most often in situations involving a
client who is unsophisticated in retaining attorneys or inadequately
informed about or incapable of understanding the risks of the con-
flict of interest.212  That is often the case in these situations.  The
athlete is young with little experience in the fields of business and
negotiation and susceptible to exploitation by agents.213  Thus, con-
sent may not even be an option, and if it is, it is a poor one.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 222.
211. See id. at 223 (noting that representation is non-consentable when it is
not reasonably likely lawyer can provide adequate representation to at least one of
two or more clients).
212. See id.
213. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 80 (explaining that agents can take
advantage of circumstances to control process and final outcomes, with minimal
input from clients).
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V. POTENTIAL NCAA RULES IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGE COACHES
WHEN THEIR AGENTS RECRUIT CURRENT AND FORMER
STUDENT-ATHLETES FROM THEIR PROGRAMS
As stated above, the relevant stakeholders largely ignore con-
flicts of interest in the sports agency industry.214  Thus, agents are
likely to continue to recruit both their client’s underclassmen—de-
spite the practice resulting in a conflict of interest—and former
players.  But what, if any, NCAA rules implications exist for college
coaches whose agents recruit their current and former student-
athletes?
On its face, a student-athlete choosing his coach’s agent is per-
missible under NCAA regulations so long as the agreement takes
place after the student-athlete’s final college game.215  However,
one does not have to look hard to see how NCAA legislation could
come into play during an agent’s recruitment of a student-athlete.
When an agent’s recruitment of a student-athlete results in an
NCAA violation, penalties can adversely affect the student-athlete
(if he retains eligibility), the coach, and the university.
This section focuses on one potential way an agent’s player re-
cruitment can lead to an NCAA violation—when the player’s coach
receives something of value from an agent in exchange for steering
the player to the agent.   This scenario should be top of mind given
the recent and well-publicized FBI investigation into men’s college
basketball.  In this analysis, it is important to understand relevant
NCAA legislation.  After an examination of the legislation, this sec-
tion discusses the application of this legislation in both a case in-
volving former University of North Carolina assistant football coach
John Blake and the allegations stemming from the FBI investigation
into corruption in men’s college basketball.  Finally, this section ex-
amines the recent Commission on College Basketball report’s rec-
ommendations regarding agents, which acknowledge the existence
of at least the temptation of coaches to accept payment for steering
players to an agent.
A. Relevant NCAA Legislation
NCAA legislation with respect to student-athletes is fairly
straightforward.  Student-athletes jeopardize their eligibility by en-
tering an agreement with an agent or accepting a benefit from an
214. See Rosner, supra note 24, at 195–96 (noting that conflicts of interest are
also widespread and difficult to prove).
215. See Masteralexis, supra note 26, at 69 (explaining NCAA legislation appli-
cable to student-athlete interactions and relationships with agents).
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agent.216  Things get more complicated when considering the
NCAA’s broad definition of an agent.  In relevant part, an agent is
an individual who: (1) represents or attempts to represent an indi-
vidual for the purpose of marketing his athletics ability or reputa-
tion for financial gain or (2) seeks to obtain any type of financial
gain or benefit from a student-athlete’s potential earnings as a pro-
fessional athlete.217
This broad definition of an agent comes into play when consid-
ering the scenario in which a coach accepts payment or a benefit
from an agent for steering a player to the agent.  NCAA rules pro-
hibit athletic department staff members from representing an indi-
vidual in the marketing of athletics ability or reputation to an agent
and for receiving compensation or gratuities for such services.218
An exception to this rule permits a head coach to contact agents on
behalf of a player provided the coach does not receive compensa-
tion for such services.219  As illustrated by the NCAA case involving
now-former University of North Carolina (“UNC”) assistant football
coach John Blake described below, a coach who accepts payment or
a benefit for steering a player to an agent violates NCAA rules.
NCAA rules further prohibit coaches from receiving benefits in ex-
change for facilitating or arranging meetings between a student-
athlete and an agent.220
B. The John Blake Case
Until the recent FBI investigation into men’s college basket-
ball, a 2012 case involving now-former UNC assistant football coach
John Blake and his ties to sports agent Gary Wichard was perhaps
the most notorious case involving a college coach involved in agent
player recruiting.221  Blake was associated with his friend Wichard’s
agency.222  The agency issued Blake a company credit card and
216. See NCAA Manual 2017-2018, supra note 204, at §§ 12.3.1, 12.3.1.3.
217. See id. at § 12.02.1.
218. See id. at § 11.1.3.
219. See id. at § 11.1.3.1.
220. See id. at § 10.1(d).
221. See Andy Staples, An Inside Look at the Case Against Former UNC Assistant
John Blake, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 26, 2011), https://www.si.com/more-sports/
2011/10/26/john-blake [https://perma.cc/BW6T-RYTN] (outlining information
obtained by Sports Illustrated in advance of Committee on Infractions hearing).
222. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, University of North Carolina Pub-
lic Infractions Decision, 2 (Mar. 12, 2012), available at https://web3.ncaa.org/
lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102358 [https://perma.cc/WBK7-PT25] (ex-
plaining that relationship between Blake and Wichard was discovered during
course of investigation into receipt of extra benefits by student-athletes).
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published a brochure describing Blake as a company vice presi-
dent.223  Blake also touted the agency and his work with it in news
articles.224  There was also evidence of a $45,000 deposit into
Blake’s bank account that originated at a bank in New York
through which Wichard conducted business.225
The NCAA Enforcement Staff had reason to believe that, while
an assistant coach at UNC, Blake helped recruit UNC student-ath-
letes to the agency and was compensated for doing so.226  In its re-
port adjudicating the matter, the NCAA Committee on Infractions
(“COI”) affirmed this belief.227  As part of the penalties it issued in
this case, the COI imposed a three-year show-cause order on Blake,
who by then had lost his job at UNC.228  While an extreme exam-
ple, the John Blake case should caution coaches from becoming
overly involved in the agent recruiting game.
C. FBI Investigation Into Men’s College Basketball
Recent events in men’s college basketball serve as a more con-
temporary deterrent to coaches from involvement in agent player
recruiting.  An FBI investigation into corruption in men’s college
basketball indicates that more than twenty of the nation’s top men’s
basketball programs possibly broke NCAA rules.229  Examples in-
clude now-former University of Arizona assistant coach Emanuel
“Book” Richardson and now-former University of Southern Califor-
nia assistant men’s basketball coach Tony Bland both allegedly ac-
cepting payments from an agent to steer student-athletes to the
223. See id. (describing “extensive evidence” that established connection be-
tween Blake and Wichard’s agency).
224. See id.
225. See id. at 13.
226. See id. at 15, 21 (explaining that Enforcement Staff was “particularly in-
terested” in details regarding a $45,000 deposit made into Blake’s bank account
originating from New York bank through which Wichard conducted business).
227. See id. at 18 (concluding that Blake continued recruiting clients for
Wichard’s agency even after returning to coaching).
228. See id. at 24.  A show-cause order essentially means that NCAA penalties
stick with the individual on whom imposed for a designated period of time and
could be transferred to another school that hires the coach before the order ex-
pires. See Nicole Auerbach, The Perception and Reality of NCAA Show-Cause Penalties,
USA TODAY (May 27, 2014, 7:15 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
lege/2014/05/27/ncaa-show-cause-penalty-bruce-pearl-kelvin-sampson/9632273/
[https://perma.cc/7NBV-KVWW].
229. See Mitch Sherman, Everything You Need to Know About the College Basketball
Scandal, ESPN (Feb. 23, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id
/22555512/explaining-ncaa-college-basketball-scandal-players-coaches-agents
[https://perma.cc/2ZG5-6TY6] (setting forth information on relevant individuals
and universities as well as timeline of FBI investigation).
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agent.230  Both assistant coaches have since lost their jobs and face
not only federal indictments but a likelihood of allegations of
NCAA rules violations when the NCAA Enforcement staff com-
pletes its investigation.231
D. Commission on College Basketball Recommendations
In response to the FBI investigation, the NCAA Board of Gov-
ernors, Division I Board of Directors, and NCAA President estab-
lished the Commission on College Basketball in October 2017.232
Composed of individuals such as former U.S. Secretary of State Dr.
Condoleezza Rice (chair of the Commission), Ohio State University
athletics director Gene Smith, former players David Robinson and
Grant Hill, and former head coaches Mike Montgomery and John
Thompson, III, the Commission’s charges included the gathering
of information to make transformative recommendations to protect
the integrity of men’s college basketball.233
In the Commission’s April 2018 Report and Recommendations to
Address the Issues Facing Collegiate Basketball, the Commission recog-
nized that agents, seeking to enter into relationships with potential
professionals when they are in high school and college, violate
NCAA rules by paying players and those with influence over players,
including coaches.234  Thus, the Commission recognizes and ac-
knowledges the present-day temptation of college coaches ac-
cepting payment to steer players to an agent in violation of NCAA
rules.
230. See id.
231. See id. (explaining that FBI charges included involvement in fraud and
corruption schemes).
232. See Commission on College Basketball, Commission on College Basketball
Charter, NCAA, § 1 (Apr. 2018), available at www.ncaa.org/governance/commis-
sion-college-basketball-charter [https://perma.cc/SQ4H-DR8R] (including infor-
mation on group including its charges, makeup, and responsibilities).
233. See id. at § 2.
234. See Commission on College Basketball, Report and Recommendations to Ad-
dress the Issues Facing Collegiate Basketball, COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL Recom-
mendation § 1A (Apr. 2018), available at www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018
CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT78-FLX8] (issuing re-
port and recommendations to NCAA Board of Governors, Division I Board of Di-
rectors, and NCAA President Mark Emmert).
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E. Recommended Parameters a Coach Should Put in Place
Should His Agent Wish to Recruit the Coach’s Players so as to
Mitigate the Likelihood of NCAA Violations
Previous sections of this Article show that it is a conflict of in-
terest for agents who represent coaches to recruit and sign their
clients’ underclassmen and that coaches are at risk of NCAA rules
violations when their agents recruit their players.  While agents
should not recruit their clients’ underclassmen, they may still be
tempted to do so.  Further, no matter how much they trust their
agents, coaches are still at risk when their agents recruit the
coaches’ student-athletes—both current and former.  This section
details parameters that coaches should put in place.  Some of these
parameters can be memorialized in the representation agreement
between the coach and his agent to mitigate risks of NCAA rules
violations associated with agents recruiting their clients’ players.235
1. A Coach and His Agent Should Agree that the Agent Will Not
Recruit Underclassmen from the Coach’s Program
Section III shows the existence of a conflict of interest when
agents recruit and sign their clients’ underclassmen.  Thus, agents
should not engage in the practice for legal reasons.  Further, when
an agent’s recruitment of a student-athlete with remaining eligibil-
ity violates NCAA rules, the potential consequences for the student-
athlete, coach and university—loss of competition eligibility—are
significant (see Section V.A. above).  A student-athlete without eligi-
bility is of little to no help to his coach’s win-loss record.  An exam-
ple is an agent who recruited one of his client’s underclassman at a
university in Texas and, while doing so, offered the student-athlete
$50,000 to commit to eventually signing with the agent.236  As cov-
ered in Section V.A above, had the student-athlete accepted the
payment and been caught by the NCAA, it would have rendered
him ineligible, likely weakening the team and perhaps costing the
coach victories.  Coaches should eliminate this risk by contractually
prohibiting their agents from recruiting their underclassmen.
235. The Author does not suggest that agents who represent coaches are
more unscrupulous than players-only agents; rather, coaches likely have more con-
trol over the agents who they hire and with whom they have a contract.
236. See Connors, supra note 25, at 770 (noting that student-athlete remained
in compliance with NCAA legislation by refusing offer).
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2. A Coach and His Agent Should Agree that the Agent Will Not
Provide Anything of Value to the Coach if the Agent Signs One
of the Coach’s Players237
A coach and his agent should stipulate that the agent will not
provide any type of benefit (e.g., payment or fee discount) if the
agent meets with or signs one of the coach’s former players.238  Do-
ing so would protect not only the coach under relevant NCAA legis-
lation (see Section IV.A. above), but also the agent if the provision
of such a benefit triggers relevant players’ association rules or state
laws.  For example, NFLPA rules prohibit agents from providing or
offering money or something of value to someone for the purpose
of inducing or encouraging that person to recommend the services
of the agent.239  The State of Texas codified a similar provision,
which prohibits agents from furnishing something of value to some-
one to induce an athlete to enter an agreement with that agent.240
3. To Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety, Coaches Should be
Leery of Involvement in a Player’s Agent Selection Process
The conclusions reached elsewhere in this Article warrant
Coach Cutcliffe’s hesitation toward recommending an agent to a
player.  A coach’s involvement in a player’s agent selection process
can put the coach at risk of potential NCAA violations in his or her
program.  Coaches would be wise to follow the trend of involving
athletics department compliance staff members in the player’s
agent selection process.241  If the coach feels compelled to recom-
237. A head coach would be wise to stipulate in writing to both his agent and
each of his staff members that the agent may not provide, and the staff member
may not accept, something of value should a player from the program sign with
the agent.  This is due to emphasis on head coach responsibility for violations
within his program memorialized in NCAA Bylaw 11.1.1.1. See generally Josh Lens,
NCAA Head Coach Responsibilities Legislation, 14 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 33 (2018)
(detailing NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation and its application and
providing recommendations for head coaches to consider implementing to
mitigate likelihood of allegation or finding).
238. The Author had the privilege and honor of assisting many Baylor Univer-
sity student-athletes and their family members in the agent selection process.  To-
ward the end of every calendar year, an agency who represents several high-profile
NFL players would send the Author a popcorn tin—even when the agency had not
signed any Baylor student-athletes.  In an abundance of caution to avoid ever be-
ing accused of providing favoritism to the agency, the Author would never accept
the popcorn tin.  The Author maintains that the gift was innocent and does not
even like popcorn that much anyway.
239. See NFL Players Association, supra note 60, at §3(B)(3).
240. See TEXAS OCC. CODE § 2051.351(9) (2011), available at https://statutes.
capitol.texas.gov/Docs/OC/htm/OC.2051.htm [https://perma.cc/CPT2-PJFT].
241. See Liz Mullen, Agent Searches Increasingly Move to Campus, SPORTS BUS. J.
(Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/09/
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mend that his or her student-athlete consider the coach’s agent, the
coach should recommend that the player interview multiple agents.
VI. CONCLUSION
Agents provide a wide range of valuable services to both their
coach and player clients. However, a college coach should be cir-
cumspect of his or her agent recruiting players from his or her pro-
gram.  When an agent recruits and signs a client’s underclassmen,
the agent does so at the expense of the coach’s welfare and thus
engages in a conflict of interest.  Further, agent recruiting can re-
sult in significant NCAA violations that can adversely impact the
coach and university.  For example, there are recent high-profile
cases where college coaches allegedly accepted payment for steer-
ing players to particular agents.  As a result of these allegations,
coaches lost their jobs and their universities face the likelihood of
NCAA investigations and penalties.  While coaches do not need to
adopt the “avoid agents at all costs” attitude of Vince Lombardi,
they would be wise to adopt and implement parameters mitigating
the likelihood of NCAA violations.
Lagor-and-Agents.aspx [https://perma.cc/D44D-TUSL]. The Author was heavily
involved in Heisman winner Robert Griffin III’s agent selection process referenced
in Mullen’s article.
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